5.Charge Conference
125 linesTHE COURT: You may be seated.
COURT CLERK: Your Honor, for the record we return back to the trial of Commonwealth versus Lindsay Clancy. All parties are present excluding the 18 jurors.
THE COURT: All right. All right. Counsel, I thought we'd have our charge conference at this time. Everybody get a chance? I know you just got them about an hour ago. So in regards to the draft that I gave, I know I got one set of proposed instructions from the defendant. Does Commonwealth have any that you wish to offer?
MS. BUCKINGHAM: We don't have the objections. We have a motion, but we just do have a few comments and a-
THE COURT: Sure. Well, that's kinda what I expected. I know everybody's been on trial, so I thought we'd just... That's kinda why I thought I'd give you the draft, that we could just kinda walk through it. So my thought would be to first go through the Commonwealth's position, and then I'll hear from the defendant. So, Attorney Buckingham.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: Thank you, Your Honor. In relation to your proposed, your draft instructions, I think that Your Honor's instruction regarding criminal responsibility is pretty much the cut and paste of the model instructions. So overall, there's no objection to it. However, the Commonwealth would just like to put on the record that we don't think that voluntary intoxication, the three points that were added in to Your Honor's drafts are necessary, and I'll just cite to the Commonwealth versus Brown, 449 Mass. 747. It's a 2007 case where it says that an instruction on voluntary intoxication is not required absent evidence of debilitating intoxication. Such evidence must support the inference that at the time of the killing, intoxication impaired the defendant's ability to form any requisite criminal intent. And so in this case, I understand counsel is gonna argue, you know, medications, and he's free to argue that to the jury. But as far as instruction goes, we're talking about criminal responsibility, we're talking about mental status at the time of the event, on the day in question of January 24th, 2023. There is no evidence to support that there was intoxication to a debilitating effect as the Brown case indicates.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: I think what the best evidence the court has is that the defendant, in her journals and in some statements that she made to the experts indicated that at the time of the offense, she was taking amitriptyline and one other medication that she had been on for quite some time, and Your Honor now has evidence that it was a very low dose of amitriptyline. And there is nothing about the observed behavior of her on that day suggesting that there was any debilitating effects of the consumption of the prescription medications on that day. So we would ask that those sections not be included in the instruction. If Your Honor is inclined to include them in the instruction, we are asking that you add a qualifier into—it's what's listed as paragraph three, where it starts to talk about the—
THE COURT: Is that on page three, kind of Roman numeral three?
MS. BUCKINGHAM: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: Roman numeral three.
THE COURT: All right. Yeah. Go ahead.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: It says, "Defendant who lost the substantial capacity I have just described, involuntarily intoxicated by prescription drugs," I—we would just ask that you add, "On the day of the offense," to again just be clear to the jury that we're talking about her consumption or the consumption of the medication on that day. I did notice a quick typo on page four under Roman numeral four, in that first full paragraph where it's the consequences of a finding. It says in the maybe fifth line, it starts, "If the court concludes the defendant is mentally ill, and that her discharge would create a substantial likelihood of serious harm to himself."
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: It's just a pronoun.
THE COURT: Right. Okay. No, I appreciate that.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: As far as the remaining charges, instructions on the charges of first degree with deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, the Commonwealth has no objection to that. I would just note another typo on page seven, where Your Honor lists out the Castillo factors. On the third factor, C and D appear to be on the same line, and there are just some numbers in there that I don't think make sense. It says, "The manner and degree of severity of the force used."
THE COURT: Oh, I gotcha. Yeah.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: And as far as the instruction on involuntary manslaughter, the Commonwealth would object to the involuntary manslaughter, and I would cite to the case of Commonwealth versus Garabedian, which is an older case, three ninety-nine Mass. three oh four. It's from nineteen eighty-seven. And it says that the defendant—in that case, the defendant argued that involuntary manslaughter was required because of evidence of involuntary chemical intoxication. That was a case where the guy was a—he sprayed chemicals on lawns, and he had an interaction with a homeowner and ended up getting into a physical altercation where they're strangling her, falling off a ledge, hitting her with a rock, and then strangling her with her shoelace. So in that particular case, the court held that an unlawful battery was quite likely to endanger life, and hence could not be classified as involuntary manslaughter. So where it's a wanton and reckless conduct theory, I think that Garabedian is right on point to say that in situations like this where we have the strangling of the individuals, of the babies, of the kids, unlawful battery is quite likely to endanger life, that it shouldn't be an instruction for involuntary manslaughter. So I'd rely on that case to argue that that is—should not be included in the instructions.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: And there's one more point. Your Honor, at one point when we were arguing about particular pieces of evidence and duplicative evidence—
THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: ... Your Honor did indicate giving some sort of instruction about the jury shouldn't consider the fact that there might be duplicative evidence as the—giving any more weight or importance. And I know you do have a small line in that where it says, in the 'what is evidence' section, about the strength of proof is not determined by the volume. But I do think, again, based on the particular way in which the evidence came in and how the parties chose to display the evidence, and the fact that we have text messages in several different forms that are presented, some of them the full record, some of them condensed records, that some instruction to them that indicates that they're to give no more weight to any one than the other, even if it does appear duplicative in the record, I'd ask that something to that effect be added.
THE COURT: I think it says that on page eleven, 'cause I do remember that request. Like put--if you look at under what is evidence. In this case, there may be certain documents or photographs that are entered multiple times. This does not mean that that evidence is any more or less important than any other evidence. So I put that in there. And I understand the request of maybe put that in a separate paragraph. But I have addressed it that way. I'll consider now whether or not I give it a separate paragraph. I do understand the request, but at least that's why I put that in there. All right. Anything else?
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Reddington.
MR. REDDINGTON: Thank you.
MR. REDDINGTON: Thank you for the time to review this stuff, Judge.
MR. REDDINGTON: If I may, just going through your proposed instructions, Roman numeral one, introduction is fine. Criminal responsibility, paragraph one is fine. Going down to page two, criminal responsibility, you indicate not a le--is a legal term, not criminally responsible with a mental disease or defect, and then you make reference to lacking substantial capacity either to appreciate criminality or wrongfulness of the conduct, or conform the conduct, that's fine. And then you define mental... You don't define it, but you talk about mental disease and defect. I understand that the law is pretty clear that the court does not have to define mental disease and defect, but you've given them a framework within which to make that decision, which is acceptable to the defendant. There is one reference in there where, if I may, does not include abnormality characterized only by repeated criminal. So you say in that sentence, the phrase mental disease or defect is a le-
THE COURT: Hold it. Let me find that.
MR. REDDINGTON: I'm sorry. It's page two.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. REDDINGTON: Second paragraph down after that first sentence.
THE COURT: I see.
MR. REDDINGTON: Okay.
THE COURT: I got the phrase. Go ahead.
MR. REDDINGTON: Yep. "Mental disease or defect," in quotes, "is a legal term, not a medical term." That's fine. It need not fit in with formal medical diagnosis. Fine. The phrase, quote, "Mental disease or defect does not include abnormality," and this is what I'm just looking at, "characterized only by repeated criminal conduct." So number one, I just would suggest—I don't think we have repeated criminal conduct here. I'm just wondering if that might just be a little confusing. It is for you to determine, in light of all the evidence, whether defendant has a mental disease or defect. If the Commonwealth has proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, Commonwealth has satisfied its burden of proving that defendant was criminally responsible.
MR. REDDINGTON: So I understand and have no problem with, I would think, all the way from "it is for you to determine." My only question is in reference to the way you put in the phrase about "does n-—mental disease or defect does not include an abnormality characterized only by repeated criminal conduct." I don't think that that's based on the evidence, so might be hyper-technical, but I just as well not have that in. Next paragraph, "If the Commonwealth has not proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, then you must consider whether, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate or the wrongfulness of conduct or conform"—that's a fair statement of the law.
"To establish that the defendant had substantial capacity to conform her conduct, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any disease or defect that may have existed did not deprive defendant of her ability to behave as the law requires, that is, to obey the law." And then you do indicate that that would relate to the word appreciate, understand more than merely to know, and then criminality, and then you do get into, means the legal significance of conduct, and wrongfulness means the moral significance, which is fine. I would ask that on the next paragraph you add in before wrong in the second sentence, "Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knew and understood that her conduct was illegal or it was," and I would ask that you put in there "morally wrong" in front of wrong. And then the rest of that paragraph is fine from my point of view. Last sentence, the court notes, "Defendant must have been able to realize in some meaningful way that her conduct was illegal or wrong," and again, I would just ask that you would insert the word morally wrong. That paragraph is fine.
MR. REDDINGTON: Roman numeral two, "A defendant's lack of criminal responsibility must be because of a mental disease or defect." That's fine, but then the court says, "All that you need to determine," and I just would ask respectfully that you delete the "all that you need to determine." It seems to kind of... And I know that's in some of the instructions, but I think it kinda dilutes the gravity of the issue for the jury. It's almost minimizing the burden for the government, and it's unnecessary, so I would ask that that go out. And then you could say the jury has to determine the issue, and then go into the rest of the instruction as you put it, rather than saying all you need to determine. Further in that paragraph, where defendant lacks substantial capacity to appreciate...
MR. REDDINGTON: Again, that's a—appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the law solely as—okay, voluntary intoxication. Believe it or not, after five weeks, I think we agree. I would ask that the court not instruct on voluntary intoxication. I appreciate the fact that looking at the model charge, and I know when Your Honor is using that to, as a guide, they do make reference to voluntary intoxication. I just don't see that there's any evidence here of voluntary intoxication that would trigger a preexisting mental disease or defect. I don't see that there's any issue such as a lot of the cases, as you well know, when you're dealing with a defendant who's snorting cocaine or shooting fentanyl or smoking weed. I know the case, the recent case of Commonwealth versus Aldo Dunphe, D-U-N-P-H-E, is a guy that had a marijuana psychosis dependency, and we don't have any of that here. We just have prescription medications that were provided to the defendant. So I would ask that the court not reference voluntary intoxication. I would ask, going down to Roman num-
THE COURT: So would you ask—so Roman numeral two-
MR. REDDINGTON: Yep.
THE COURT: ... on page two, not give?
MR. REDDINGTON: Yes.
THE COURT: And Commonwealth, that you would be in agreement with that?
MS. BUCKINGHAM: Yes, but I think, like, two also follows with Roman numeral three and-
THE COURT: We haven't got to three. So I just—I wanna make sure the—but I just kinda wanna make sure as I'm going through this, 'cause it's kinda dense, you know, as am I sometimes.
MR. REDDINGTON: Yeah, it is a little.
THE COURT: So I just wanted to make sure-
MR. REDDINGTON: I agree.
THE COURT: ... So Roman numeral two. Both parties are of the position not to give based on the evidence as it's developed.
MR. REDDINGTON: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. REDDINGTON: Yeah, thank you.
THE COURT: All right. I'll consider that. I'll strongly consider that.
MR. REDDINGTON: All right.
THE COURT: And then so that takes us to paragraph three.
MR. REDDINGTON: In paragraph three, if I'm not mistaken, I did skim it pretty quickly, I think it does also reference voluntary intoxication.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. REDDINGTON: And here you're specifying prescription drugs and, if the defendant knew or had reason to know that her intoxication would trigger or intensify a mental disease or defect. I don't think that the evidence supports that. I agree with the Commonwealth. I would ask that Roman numeral three-
THE COURT: All right. So by agreement, nobody's requesting paragraph three.
MR. REDDINGTON: Correct.
THE COURT: And I'm highly-
MR. REDDINGTON: Thank you.
THE COURT: ... likely not to give that.
MR. REDDINGTON: All right.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. REDDINGTON: Four is fine, Judge. Roman numeral five...
MS. BUCKINGHAM: Four goes to the same thing. It's just a reiteration of the final... So if we're saying the same-
MR. REDDINGTON: Yeah, so that would go out. Yep.
THE COURT: Four is kind of a trailer to-
MS. BUCKINGHAM: Right.
THE COURT: ... to three? Okay.
MR. REDDINGTON: Roman numeral five is okay. Paragraph three, four, okay, so again, if I may just say without skimming them now, any time it's referencing voluntary intoxication, maybe that could be deleted. 'Cause I see in paragraph four and Roman numeral five on page three, it does reference again her voluntary intoxication from prescription drugs and that type of thing. So that would go out.
MR. REDDINGTON: Paragraph six, talking about in the event that the defendant is indeed acquitted by reason of lack of criminal responsibility, I know the court has the obligation to instruct the jury as to what potential ramifications would flow from that. I believe that's a fair statement of the law. Instructions on murder in the first degree, deliberate premeditation, cruelty and atrocity. Those are all fine. Second degree, that's fine. Involuntary manslaughter, I do think certainly the facts as presented and the evidence does justify the instruction as the court—
THE COURT: Let me hear you. What's the argument in regards to the involuntary manslaughter?
MR. REDDINGTON: Well, the argument regarding the involuntary manslaughter is clearly that the defendant intended the conduct that resulted in the death of the deceased. And the conduct in the event that it was not such that her conduct was as a result of her suffering from a disease or defect, intentional, premeditated, and intended to be cruel and atrocious, that would reduce it down to manslaughter, and it would most certainly be wanton or reckless. I will be addressing voluntary as well, but I think it's clear that on the evidence that if the jury determines that defendant committed an act, defendant, as a result of the act, the victims were indeed died, that there's a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm would result to the individuals as a result of the defendant's conduct. But yet we're not talking about a disease, a defect that rises to the level of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility. You would then revert to or default, if you will, to the standard of wanton and reckless conduct. And we know that wanton or reckless conduct under the Wolanski case, basically if a defendant does an intentional act that is not just, not just negligent, it would have to rise to the criminal standard or the criminal level of being wanton or reckless. So I think that that would in fact justify an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
MR. REDDINGTON: As oppo- If you want, I can continue with the invo- with the voluntary manslaughter that I would ask the court to instruct, and that would relate to the issue of diminished capacity. I know the court is very familiar with Commonwealth versus Gould. I believe it's three hundred Mass six seventy-two. Supreme Court decision, Patterson versus New York, that talks about evidence of a defendant's emotional or intellectual or mental state of mind that does not rise to the level of lack of criminal responsibility, but it could certainly rise to the level of extreme emotional disturbance, that that would be manslaughter, not murder, and that would be under and consistent with the United States Constitution as well as the Massachusetts Constitution, because in addition to Commonwealth versus Gould, we have case law, as I'm sure you— I know Your Honor is aware, that talks about diminished capacity. It talks about mental disease or defect.
If in fact there's evidence of a mental disease or defect, mental impairment, but it does not rise to the level of lack of criminal responsibility, then under all of those cases I just cited, plus Garabedian at three ninety-nine Mass thirty-four, as well as my old case of Thomas Toolin, four ninety Mass six ninety-eight, you can have evidence of mental disease or defect that does not rise to the level of lack of criminal responsibility, but it would mitigate or reduce from the ability of the person to know that what they're doing is in fact cruel and atrocious, to know what they're doing does constitute premeditated malice aforethought. We all know what the concept of malice is. You got the three prongs of malice. There's no doubt that mens rea is important on the concept of malice. And if a jury says, "Well, look, the evidence is that she was going to these doctors, that she was getting prescribed medication, she was taking the medication, she was in a postpartum depression stage. I don't buy the postpartum psychosis, but I think that clearly she was overmedicated or had medications that she was involved with, plus her postpartum depression." That would then justify them to say, "It reduces her ability to think, to react, to know as it relates to malice," which under those cases I cited would reduce to voluntary manslaughter. So that would be voluntary manslaughter. The willful, wanton conduct would be involuntary manslaughter.
MR. REDDINGTON: Reasonable doubt obviously is fine. All the rest of the instructions that you gave, or that you would give, are fine. I would ask that the court consider the prospect int- and by way of considering involuntary intoxication. And I did cite a couple of cases, Commonwealth versus Wallace and Darsh, Piantedosi, as it relates to evidence of involuntary intoxication. And that would apply if in fact there's no intentional ingestion of cocaine or some type of illicit drug, but in fact it's a prescription drug that she was ingesting consistent with the drug instructions, if you will. You know, the drug laboratories and the pharmaceutical companies, they market these products. They have, some of them have black box warnings on them. We've talked about that a little bit in this trial, talked about the age cutoff, but nevertheless, it's scary stuff. You're talking the selective serotonin uptake inhibitors. You're talking about tricyclics. You're talking about antipsychotics. So if in fact this young lady did not have a disease or a defect that rose to the level of lack of criminal responsibility, but as a result of the drugs that she was prescribed, not abusing, not mixing with illegal or illicit drugs, that would allow a jury to determine that it would be manslaughter based upon the involuntary intoxication.
MR. REDDINGTON: And finally, I would ask that the court entertain giving a Bowden charge in this case. We know that case law under Commonwealth versus Bowden allows the court, upon evidence presented to a jury, of inadequate police investigation. Because if you recall, way back in the day on this case, I did move for a bifurcation, and my argument to the court was that defendants in lack of criminal responsibility cases are really hogtied, if you will, because to have the lack of criminal responsibility, you have to admit involvement in the crime, but yet when you're trying the case with lack of criminal responsibility, the government still has the burden to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of, based on the evidence, that particular crime. And if there's evidence of a police investigation that is deficient, a jury does have a right to consider that as a basis of an acquittal. They can consider that for purposes of finding reasonable doubt based upon the lousy investigation. In this case, it wasn't just a lousy investigation. It wasn't even an atrocious investigation. It was no investigation. In this case, Judge, the police, I think we all would agree, even the government, they basically accepted the fact that she strangled the kids, the kids are in the basement, she's guilty, and we move on. They didn't investigate anything. They didn't test the screen. They didn't even take a picture of the screen. They didn't see if there's any blood on the screen. There's no crushers for the alleged crushing of the medications.
MR. REDDINGTON: There's no indication that there's powder that she was crushing the medication to ingest the medication. There's all sorts of questions regarding the blood spatter, the blood. The police never investigated. They come into the court. They talk about their investigation through the crime scene laboratory and state police. And every question that I would ask about the door, about the blood drop on the door, about the siding, they come, six months later or whatever, they take the siding. It's degraded. They can't even test it. I could go on and on and on with the horrific investigation in this case. So I think it would be fair for the court to instruct them on Bowden. That's it.
THE COURT: All right. Commonwealth, I know there was one—well, there were two requests I think there were. You may not have been aware of, but I wanted to give you an opportunity to be heard. One is the Bowden instruction. Also, one is the voluntary manslaughter. Before I let you do that, if I'm looking at the instruction that I have as a possible instruction regarding involuntary manslaughter, Ms. Rankin, does it—if we took the word involuntary out of there, doesn't that instruction there apply to the argument that you're making, considering the last paragraph?
MR. REDDINGTON: Which—I'm sorry, which paragraph?
THE COURT: Yeah, on page eight.
MR. REDDINGTON: Okay. I'm with you.
THE COURT: Where it's talking about the manslaughter instruction.
MR. REDDINGTON: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: In the last paragraph, it talks about the ability to consider evidence from either a mental impairment or consumption of prescription drugs. Um—
MR. REDDINGTON: No, I agree with that, Your Honor. If we were to fashion that, I think that that instruction would cover—
THE COURT: To just one instruction.
MR. REDDINGTON: … voluntary, involuntary. It doesn't really matter.
THE COURT: That's what I just—that's what I wanted, that's kind of what I was thinking, just to go—
MR. REDDINGTON: I agree with you.
THE COURT: … if I give it, it would just be one instruction, and I wouldn't—I wouldn't name it either involuntary or voluntary.
MR. REDDINGTON: That's fine.
THE COURT: It would just be, if I give that. Okay.
MR. REDDINGTON: Okay.
THE COURT: I, and I think, Attorney Buckingham, I don't know if the only... I know the Commonwealth objects to that anyway, so I'm not asking for the assent on that. But what about the Bowden instruction?
MS. BUCKINGHAM: So Your Honor, we would object to the Bowden instruction. Again, counsel's free to argue whatever he wants about the police investigation in this case. But as far as failures of the investigation that have been identified in the course of the trial, I don't see that there is any. Everything that Attorney Vaniecus just said about what they didn't test. They didn't, they didn't test the screen. Well, there's clear photographs of the screen and the condition of the screen, and that was very apparent. That was done on the day of the incident. It was documented. Witnesses testified about that. Witnesses gave statements about the window in and of itself. The blood on the outside of the house was observed.
There's been adequate testimony about why it wasn't swabbed on that particular day, and there also has been adequate testimony about subsequent decisions to go back and get information or get the swabs from that area and what testing was done, and that there was testing done to identify that it was the defendant's blood that was on the outside. So I think that the evidence, you know, the claims have been made, but the evidence shows that there has been an adequate police investigation. The only point of contention appears to be the drawer and the pill bottles, and there's been some claims made about things that were not done about those things. But again, I think there's been adequate testimony about why those things weren't flagged on the day of the incident. They didn't—police weren't aware of the fact that there was actually an ingestion of medications on that particular day.
And when they did notify, or when they were aware, we had prescription bottles that were provided by Patrick Clancy. But those bottles in that drawer conveniently never got produced for testing or further analysis. So I think, again, he's free to argue it. I don't think it rises to the level of an instruction. And just to kind of as a side note on a comment about involuntary instruction, I don't think there is a one. So I would ask that the court not consider that because I don't think there is an actual instruction about it. Again, counsel's free to argue that in the form of intent, in the form of whether, you know, the Commonwealth has met its burden regarding criminal responsibility. But as far as I can find, there's no particular instruction on that.
MS. BUCKINGHAM: And if Your Honor were to provide an instruction, then according to the case law, if it's raised to that level, then we would have the burden of proving voluntary consumption, which would put all of that back into play that we've now disagreed with.
THE COURT: All right. All right. Well, I am gonna give a manslaughter instruction in line with basically what's on page eight. I am not gonna give a Bowden instruction. The defendant is free to argue that, any deficiencies that he feels that are in the investigation, certainly free to argue. I will not give the voluntary intoxication instructions in regards to the criminal responsibilities. So, and so I'll have, you know, I'll have a better draft kinda in the morning, but I just kinda wanted to let you know what the instructions are, so that you can prepare, you know, your closing arguments. And speaking of those closings, how much time do you think you may need on that?
MR. REDDINGTON: I'm usually pretty quick. I would say half hour.
THE COURT: All right. All right.
MS. SPRAGUE: I was thinking more of an hour.
THE COURT: All right. I was thinking of all the testimony, all the exhibits. If the parties want an hour, you don't have to use it all.
MR. REDDINGTON: Okay.
THE COURT: And like I said, I've seen all three of you try cases, so I know you'll be making progress. So if it gets to one hour and one minute, I'm not gonna push the button. So just so we can kinda have some estimate. All right. Anything else we need to address, you think, before tomorrow?
MR. REDDINGTON: Don't think so.
MS. SPRAGUE: No.
THE COURT: All right. Well, counsel, again, thanks for all your efforts in regards to this. So I'll have a full copy of this first thing in the morning, and we'll do arguments to charge, hopefully, as soon as we are ready tomorrow morning.
MR. REDDINGTON: There is one other minor matter that we've talked about. There is that police report, the security sergeant from the hospital, Brigham and Women's, that we're gonna redact and just reduce to, like, a paragraph. She's the one that I summons, but she's on maternity leave. And we can introduce that, just that one paragraph. And we're missing one exhibit, which is the infant's hospital in Rhode Island, but we're gonna look and see if the government has it.
MS. SPRAGUE: I— We don't have it. I thought that... But we'll double-check. I thought that defense had decided not to put in anything from that report because he was going to provide a proper— not a proper, I'm sorry, a proposed stipulation for that, portions of that report, and then he didn't, so I didn't think that... And then we both rested, and then I rested again. So I didn't think that was coming in, but I'm happy to look over what defense has stipulate, what wants to stipulate to.
MR. REDDINGTON: Just a paragraph.
THE COURT: All right. So why don't we do that? If there's a need to technically reopen the case so that the parties could put in what they thought they put in, if it's by agreement, if it's just in regards to some of those records, I think we could do that.
MR. REDDINGTON: Okay.
THE COURT: So anything else?
MS. SPRAGUE: No.
THE COURT: How about redactions? That was the other thing. We're— Was it just that one report or a couple reports we're gonna have to deal with?
MS. SPRAGUE: I believe that everything that required redaction has been redacted.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
MR. REDDINGTON: I think so. Yeah, I'm not aware of anything we have to—
THE COURT: All right. I'm just asking. All right. All right. So thank you very much. We'll see everybody tomorrow morning.
MR. REDDINGTON: Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
BAILIFF: Court, all rise.