1.Request for Further Juror Inquiry Denied
48 linesBAILIFF: This court is now in session. Please be seated.
COURT CLERK: Good morning, Your Honor. May I proceed?
THE COURT: Yes, please.
COURT CLERK: Your Honor, before the court we have the matter of Commonwealth versus Lindsay Clancy. Ms. Clancy is present. She is represented by attorney Kevin Reddington. The Commonwealth is represented by Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Sprague and Assistant District Attorney Shanan Buckingham.
THE COURT: All right. Well, good morning, everyone. Good morning, counsel.
MS. SPRAGUE: Good morning.
THE COURT: Hi. Good morning, Ms. Clancy.
MS. CLANCY: Good morning, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So, at the end of the day yesterday, there was a note that was sent in from the jury, and we put over to today to address it. Commonwealth, you had the opportunity to review that note?
MS. SPRAGUE: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Defendant, you had the opportunity?
MR. REDDINGTON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And so, I will hear from the parties as to how each party suggests or requests I deal with that note. So, wanna hear from the Commonwealth first.
MS. SPRAGUE: Thank you, Your Honor. I apologize for my voice. So Commonwealth's suggestion is that the jurors be instructed to return to their deliberations without any further instruction of voir dire. The basis for that request is Commonwealth versus Ronchi, R-O-N-C-H-I, 491 Mass. 284 from 2023. In that case, it's a similar situation where it's reported one juror is having issues with the other jurors. And it says in that case, where reliable information comes to a judge suggesting a lack of impartiality, bias, extraneous influence, or inability to deliberate, that there should be an individual voir dire hearing regarding that. We don't have any of those circumstances here. There's no indication of a lack of impartiality, or bias, or extraneous influence, and no indication of inability to deliberate. In fact, they've deliberated for a very long time in this case and very conscientiously. So what we have here is a note that indicates a disagreement about how to weigh the evidence, and that's deliberation. So it's the Commonwealth's position, especially considering the fact that Your Honor voir dire'd each of the jurors yesterday and they all said that they could follow your instructions. So, when you couple that with the requirements of Ronchi, I don't think an individual voir dire is necessary. If Your Honor does determine to do one, we would just ask, along the lines of all the case law in this area, Ronchi, Williams, Torres, the whole string of cases, that the juror be instructed not to comment on the deliberations, and that the juror be told that he—he or she cannot be discharged unless a personal problem unrelated to their relationship with the jurors or their views on the case.
MS. SPRAGUE: And that any attempt or any comments by the juror that tend to get into deliberations, that Your Honor interrupt and remind the juror that we're not to get into that, and that questioning be ceased of the juror unless he or she indicates that there is a personal problem unrelated to the case or the relationships.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Defendant?
MR. REDDINGTON: Thank you very much, Your Honor. Appreciate the opportunity to argue this to you. Couple of points that occur to me. First of all, as Your Honor is well aware, a defendant, any defendant in this courtroom or any courtroom in our country, is entitled to have a juror who is true to their oath, who will agree that they will apply the facts as they determine them to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the law or as given to them by you as a judge, or any other judge. If a jury consists of people and there's one person who is refusing to actually apply the law to the facts as determined for reasons that are not arising out of the case, but are personal to the juror's position regarding their review of their oath and how they should apply their oath. In other words, if it's personal to this individual, which I believe it is, based on the first question that you had.
And I have never seen a situation like this where a foreperson on the jury is so courageous as to speak on behalf of 11 jurors and indicate that juror number, which I will not mention, and I quote, "Has made statements acknowledging doubt, but refuses to apply it to the verdict as the law states." Clearly, Judge, we have a person who, under their oath, stood in front of you yesterday when you did the individual voir dire, and according to this information, under oath, looked you in the eye and lied. That juror told you that he would be able to apply the law to the facts as you asked him, and based on this note from this juror, it clearly and unequivocally indicates that they are basically 11 to one, and this person will not apply reasonable doubt to the evidence to return a not guilty verdict. I would ask that the court would— And I know it's awkward. I'm familiar with the law. I know that we try to protect and preserve the sanctity, if you will, of the jury— We don't want to invade their deliberations. We wanna keep that private. Obviously, that's a good thing to do.
MR. REDDINGTON: But when you have a situation where you have not one, but two notes that clearly indicates that this individual has acknowledged doubt, but refuses to apply it to the verdict, he is, as the law states, he is not being honest with you at the sidebar. I would go so far as to reluctantly say that the individual has made a false statement under oath to this court. There has to be an issue that is not arising out of deliberations and the facts of this case, but the individual is refusing to apply your instructions on proof beyond a reasonable doubt to allow that jury to return a verdict of not guilty.
THE COURT: All right.
MS. SPRAGUE: If I may, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure.
MS. SPRAGUE: I just wanted to put on the record that the note does not indicate that this juror lied to Your Honor when responding. The note indicates that the parties disagree on what is reasonable doubt or what doubt is and how it should be applied, and we are in no position to judge if the 11 are right or the one is right. But there's no indication that the juror is intentionally trying to mislead the court or lie to the court.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Well, as all three counsel are aware, the case law spells out kinda the concerns that everybody has in a situation like this, where it says, "The discharge of a deliberating juror is sensitive undertaking, fraught with potential error. It's to be done only in special circumstances with special precautions. A judge must take the utmost caution to avoid invading the province of the jury." And that's what I'm concerned with in this, at this point. And as even under the statute, during deliberations, a juror properly may be discharged only for reasons personal to that juror, having nothing whatsoever to do... Nothing whatever, I'm sorry, to do with the issues of the case or with the juror's relationship with their fellow jurors. In this case here, I see no showing of the need for an inquiry of this particular juror. The note that we were referring to, the one from late yesterday afternoon, indicates that the juror has, it says, acknowledged doubt, but refuses to apply it to the verdict. Well, the instruction that the SJC has suggested we give in regards to reasonable doubt, and that both parties agreed to, says that reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt. And so in reading that note carefully and strictly in the way that I have to before I possibly invade the province of the jury, that note does not indicate that this is a person who has refused to follow the law.
THE COURT: And in addition, as the parties recognized yesterday, we brought all the jurors in, including the juror who is at issue here, and we asked, I asked, whether or not those jurors could follow the instructions, including the instruction I just referred to. And all the jurors indicated that they could. This is not a case that there's any indication that the juror has refused to deliberate, or has any reason, has indicated that they would not follow the law or that they're physically suffering or there's no note from the juror that indicates that the juror cannot or will not be able to continue deliberating as some of the other cases talk about. So for reasons of, for that, I'm not going to do a further inquiry of this juror, over the defendant's objection. And at that point, my inclination would be to bring the jury back. If—my thought would be, though, to remind them that it's their duty to accept the law as I give it to them, and that they have to follow that law. And I think this is what I told them a week ago. They have to follow it whether they like it or not. So I'm going to give them that instruction and remind them of that. So with that, um-
MR. REDDINGTON: Now, Your Honor, I ...
MR. REDDINGTON: Go ahead.
MS. SPRAGUE: Oh, I was just going to ask that the court also instruct the jurors or remind them that any future notes should not contain—
THE COURT: Oh, yeah.
MS. SPRAGUE: ...any information about deliberations.
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, here's what I was gonna say. If there's any notes or any future notes, if there are any, you should refrain from detailing any of the actual deliberations, and do not indicate where they stand numerically.
MR. REDDINGTON: So a couple of things.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. REDDINGTON: First of all, Your Honor acknowledges that I have an objection, which I appreciate, and I do have an objection, and I am, again, citing Article 12 of, Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This is, this goes beyond Massachusetts law. This is constitutional. It's a structural, I suggest respectfully, defect in the procedure that we're engaged in. We're elevating form over substance, and that's Your Honor's ruling. I understand. I've objected. But I would ask that you not instruct the jury that they cannot indicate anything. And I understand why traditionally we tell jurors, "Don't let us know what your division is or what your split is," but in this case, I'm concerned that if you do that, that foreperson is gonna feel that that is some type of, that she violated something and might feel that Your Honor is kinda coming down on her and not to do that, and I think it's too delicate right now a situation.
MR. REDDINGTON: And in addition, and finally, I would ask that you not just give them, as I described it yesterday, a soft inquiry, where you listen to my instructions. I would ask that you specifically direct their attention to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and reinstruct them on that forcefully.
THE COURT: I think I did that yesterday, didn't I?
MS. SPRAGUE: Yes.
MR. REDDINGTON: You did it yesterday, you did it soft, you didn't do it forcefully—
THE COURT: I mean, what do you want—
MR. REDDINGTON: And I'm asking that you do it forcefully.
THE COURT: What do you want me to do?
MR. REDDINGTON: I want you to tell the jurors—
THE COURT: Get a brass band? I read the instruction as written by the SJC.
MR. REDDINGTON: Right.
THE COURT: The fact that I perhaps didn't give it my full inflection, I'm sorry about that. I'm not an actor. I've just given the instructions.
MR. REDDINGTON: Well, my point, Judge, simply is that you're kind of glossing over the issue. The issue is this juror will not, according to that note, apply the law of reasonable doubt, and that's why I've requested, you know what I've requested—
THE COURT: Right.
MR. REDDINGTON: ... so I note my objection.
THE COURT: But just in case the record's clear, I am specifically not glossing over this issue. I have thought about this issue long and hard. I know the defendant objects, but the characterization that I'm glossing over it, trust me, that's not the situation. I've been thinking about this for quite a while. So that's my— that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to just give that instruction, as I said, that they have to follow, follow my instructions. I'm not going to reiterate the reasonable doubt at this point. It may come to that again if, as we go through it. And I'll try and give this with more pizzazz than I gave yesterday, I suppose. But, so with that, we'll bring the jury back in, and I'll ask the questions. I'll give those kind of— that instruction, and we'll send them back out. Okay.