3.Deadlock Hearing, Mistrial Ruling and SJC Stay
54 linesBAILIFF: This court is now in session. You may be seated.
COURT CLERK: Your Honor, for the purpose of the record, we return back to the matter of Commonwealth versus Lindsay Clancy. All parties are present, excluding the jury.
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, have you seen the question?
MS. SPRAGUE: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. REDDINGTON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And the question is, "It is with a heavy heart that we report we are unable to come to a unanimous decision and will not be able to."
THE COURT: Well, let me ask what is the party's position in regards to that question?
MS. SPRAGUE: Your Honor, from the Commonwealth's perspective, since the Tuohy instruction has already been given, and then there was lengthy deliberation after that, I think that it would require a mistrial at this point.
THE COURT: Attorney Reddington.
MR. REDDINGTON: Your Honor, my understanding is that this court has the discretion to have the jury sent back for the second time. The first time that there was a report, we did not treat it as a report of deadlock. We did not instruct them under Tuohy. We did not give them soft Tuohy. We didn't give them anything. We just sent them back to deliberate. So technically, we have one report of deadlock that Your Honor gave the Tuohy/Rodriguez charge to. I believe under the statute, as well as the case law, this court has the ability to send the jury back. The fact that that jury foreperson wrote, very unusually, "It is with a heavy heart that we are unable to come to a decision," based on the earlier questions that we have, I think that it would be a sound and a wise decision for this court to send it back under the law.
THE COURT: Well, I would find that under case law—Massachusetts case law and statutory law, the jury did not ask to be sent back, which it would be a possibility if they had requested it to be sent back to them. But under the statute and the case law, I don't feel I have any choice but to declare a mistrial at this time.
MR. REDDINGTON: Well, before you do, I'd like to be heard, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, that's why I asked you before, but go ahead.
MR. REDDINGTON: Well, I just got to the first one.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. REDDINGTON: I didn't get to the other one, so.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. REDDINGTON: Your Honor, I would suggest to the court that as we are pretty much all familiar with, under Cameron Reid versus the Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court, through Justice Georges back in February of '25, held that under Rule 27 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, quote, "Gives a trial judge discretion to require a jury to return a verdict for charges on which they have agreed before declaring a mistrial, as it relates to..." And again, I continue, quote, "Judge may first require the jury to return verdicts on those charges upon which the jury can agree and direct that such verdicts be received and recorded." It goes on further, and I quote, "Rule 27 also permits the judge to poll the jury when a verdict is returned and before the verdict is recorded. However, a judge is not required to accept a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial." So I'm asking that the court would entertain a poll of the jurors as to whether or not there has been a decision on murder one, murder two, manslaughter, anything like that.
MR. REDDINGTON: And if that's the case, then I certainly would argue that double jeopardy is attached, and those charges cannot be prosecuted again.
THE COURT: All right. Commonwealth?
MS. SPRAGUE: I would object to that, Your Honor. It would go into the deliberations. I think we're in a different scenario here than the Reid case, where I believe in that case, they did reach a verdict on certain charges and not on others. But I think here, where we've had a jury who's been deliberating for six and a half days, who's come back on multiple occasions saying that they're deadlocked, who have been given Tuohy, I don't think anything else is required at this point, other than the declaration of a mistrial, unfortunately.
THE COURT: Over the defendant's objection, I'm gonna declare a mistrial at this point. All right. All right, if we can bring the jury in.
MR. REDDINGTON: Your Honor, while we're waiting for the jury, forgive me for raising this issue. I would ask that before you formally declare a mistrial, that the court afford us the opportunity to take a 2113 appeal direct to the Supreme Judicial Court, single justice, on this issue because of any number of issues that are of concern, others that have been addressed in the motions, the objections, but I further raise the issue of the American with Disabilities Act. I believe that this is a-
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. REDDINGTON: … a situation where there is a clear and present danger that this individual, for some reason, what it is we don't know, but is taking a position that's intractable regardless of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So I want an opportunity to take an appeal to the single justice if the court will afford us that opportunity.
THE COURT: How much time do you need to do that?
MR. REDDINGTON: I'd have it filed today, and argue tomorrow.
THE COURT: Saturday?
MR. REDDINGTON: They would do it on an emergency, yeah. I mean, I can try.
THE COURT: So we're gonna tell this jury to come back tomorrow? I'm just trying to f- I, you know-
THE COURT: I, I, the, the-
MR. REDDINGTON: I don't care. They can come back on Sunday.
THE COURT: … the reason I'm asking it… I know, but as they're walking in, you're asking for this. I'm just trying to find out what it is that you're asking for. That's all.
MR. REDDINGTON: What I'm asking for is time to file a-
THE COURT: Right.
MR. REDDINGTON: … single justice appeal for this travesty. That's what I'm asking for.
THE COURT: So you're asking for an emergency stay at this point?
MR. REDDINGTON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. REDDINGTON: And the jurors don't have to come back tomorrow. They can be told that they don't even have to come back if I lose the motion, but if I win the motion, then obviously they would have to come back Tuesday.
THE COURT: I'll—if you want to go up and petition to the SJC for a stay, I'll give you an hour before we bring the jury back down. I think you could... It's just a request for the stay of the declaration of the mistrial. So I'll hold off for an hour, and then we'll come back in, in regards to that.
MR. REDDINGTON: Okay.
THE COURT: All right.
BAILIFF: Court, all rise.
BAILIFF: This court is now in session. You may be seated.
COURT CLERK: Your Honor, for the purpose of the record, we return back to the matter, Commonwealth versus Lindsay Clancy. All parties are present, excluding the jury.
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, it's my understanding that the SJC issued their order that the emergency request for relief was denied, and that the temporary stay is lifted. And so it would be my intention at this time to call the jurors back in, and as I indicated to you before, to declare a mistrial.
MR. REDDINGTON: I understand, Your Honor, and at the risk of incurring the wrath of the court, I'd like to raise an additional issue just for purposes of the federal law, because this, I believe, constitutes a violation of the United States Constitution and federal issue. In our circuit, which is the First Circuit, when a jury reports through a foreperson that amid deliberation that a juror refuses to follow the law, the issue is handled under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23B, but the law itself that we're dealing with clearly indicates that a judge has the authority to excuse a deliberating juror for, quote, "good cause," end quote, and allow the remaining 11 jurors to return a valid verdict and/or with the substitution of one of the jurors that have been waiting, obviously, as alternates. While the First Circuit acknowledges that a juror's refusal to follow the law or instructions constitutes good cause for dismissal, it does impose procedural issues as to how the court would navigate, and which would require a hearing. The core standard is United States versus Sepulveda, S-E-P-U-L-V-E-D-A, First Circuit 1993, and in that case, Your Honor, which is significant precedent, the First Circuit addressed the underlying concept of nullification in a—where a juror refuses to follow the court's instructions. And in the Sepulveda case, the court held that while jurors possess a raw power to acquit for any reason, they have a significant duty, and their duty requires them to apply the law as given to them by the court. If a juror abdicates this duty, it triggers the court's authority to intervene, and the court—
THE COURT: One second.
MR. REDDINGTON: ... would then have a procedure where you would inquire just like a hearing, like we were suggesting that the court should have a hearing. So I would suggest, Your Honor, that clearly under the First Circuit law, federal law as well as the argument to the court, Massachusetts law, that we have a juror who has, according to the foreperson, is the only person who is basically holding out, so to speak, and unfortunately they're not holding out based on a good faith issue with the facts or with the law, but they're holding out as a result that even though they have agreed and expressed doubt, they are refusing to apply the law as you've given it. So I would ask again that you conduct a hearing and understand that you're—
THE COURT: All right.
MR. REDDINGTON: ... probably gonna deny that.
THE COURT: For reasons as I stated earlier this morning, that request will be denied. All right. So we ready to bring the jury in?